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The question of whether and how financial 
aid affects college enrollment remains central 
in discussions of higher education policy. Most 
econometric investigations of this question 
identify causal effects using  non-experimental 
strategies such as covariate conditioning, 
 differences-in-differences panel methods, and 
regression discontinuity (RD) designs. The 
resulting empirical analyses have produced a 
wide range of estimates, perhaps reflecting the 
diversity of the models and assumptions used in 
this work (see research surveyed in Deming and 
Dynarski 2009).
In an effort to produce credible and robust 
estimates of the causal effects of aid on 
 post-secondary outcomes, we’ve worked 
with the Susan Thompson Buffett Foundation (STBF) to conduct a randomized evaluation 
of STBF’s longstanding scholarship program 
for Nebraska high school seniors. Findings to 
date are detailed in our working paper Angrist 
et al. (2014).1 Our focus here is methodologi-
cal: in the spirit of LaLonde’s (1986) pioneering 
1 Briefly, these results show that scholarship offers 
increased total financial aid received substantially. This in 
turn generated modest gains in initial enrollment, with a 
marked treatment-induced shift from two- to four-year cam-
puses, an effect that increases in the second post-program 
year. 
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 comparison of job training effects from ran-
domized and  non-experimental analyses, and 
the recent Wing and Cook (2013) within-study 
evaluation of a RD design, we compare our 
experimental results with covariate-controlled 
estimates from a pre-experimental cohort and 
with RD estimates from the experimental sam-
ple. The results show covariates do little to miti-
gate selection bias, but RD estimates that exploit 
institutional idiosyncrasies in the award process 
come close to an appropriately-defined experi-
mental benchmark. On the other hand, the RD 
estimates are sensitive to controls for the run-
ning variable.
I. The Buffett Scholarship
The STBF-eligible applicant pool contains 
Nebraska-resident high school seniors and grad-
uates of in-state high schools who have not yet 
attended college. Awardees are selected on the 
basis of financial need, college readiness, and 
a review of personal statements and reference 
letters. These award winners, called Buffett 
Scholars, receive grants worth full tuition and 
fees that can be used at any Nebraska public col-
lege. Grants are renewable for up to five years, 
so that students attending the most-expensive 
in-state public college can receive more than 
$60,000 in total. Buffett Scholars who attend 
one of the three University of Nebraska cam-
puses also participate in Learning Communities (LCs), an academic services intervention.
Our experiment has randomly awarded more 
than 2,000 scholarships since 2012. Prior to 
the experiment, applicants were chosen by 
individual reviewers without a formal ranking 
procedure. Starting in 2012, reviewers scored 
applicants using a common rubric. The highest 
scoring applicants (301 out of 1,430 eligible 
applicants in 2012) were guaranteed awards, 
while the lowest-scoring (127) were removed 
from consideration. The remainder (1,003) 
were subject to random assignment, with award 
rates varying by students’ intended colleges, 
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which we call strata. The analysis reported here 
compares covariate-controlled estimates from 
the 2011  non-experimental cohort to the 2012 
experimental results. In addition, we use the 
2012 threshold for guaranteed awards to con-
struct RD estimates from the experimental data.2
II. Econometric Methods
Let  D indicate aid offers, and let  Y 1 and 
Y 0 denote potential outcomes in treated and 
untreated states, respectively. The observed out-
come is determined by
  y =  Y 0 +  ( Y 1 −  Y 0 ) D. 
We wish to estimate the average treatment effect (ATE), defined as
  δ ≡ E [ Y 1 −  Y 0 ] . 
Random assignment within strata (that is, con-
ditional random assignment (CRA)) implies 
that potential outcomes in treated and untreated 
states are mean-independent of treatment condi-
tional on stratum, denoted by  x :
(1)  E [ Y j | D, x  ] = E [ Y j | x  ] ;  j = 0, 1 .
Given CRA, simple treatment-control contrasts 
within strata,
  Δ x = E [ y | x, D = 1] − E [ y | x, D = 0] , 
provide unbiased estimates of the strata-specific 
average treatment effects,  δ x ≡ E [ Y 1 −  Y 0 | x  ] . 
Averaging these conditional contrasts across 
strata generates a matching estimand for ATE:
  δ = E [ δ x ] = E [ Δ x ] . 
We’re also interested in regression estimates 
computed by fitting
(2)  y =  α x + ρD + η,  
where  α x is a fixed-effect for each stratum and η is the regression error. Angrist (1998) shows 
2 Scholarship application reviewers were unaware 
of the thresholds for random assignment when scoring 
applications. 
that the regression estimand in such models is 
also an average of conditional treatment effects, 
specifically
  ρ = E {  λ x (1 −  λ x ) _________  E[ λ x (1 −  λ x )]  δ x } , 
where  λ x ≡ E[D | x] is the conditional prob-
ability of treatment within strata. Ordinary 
least squares (OLS) therefore estimates a vari-
ance-weighted average of strata-specific average 
causal effects.
A natural starting point for identification 
without random assignment is a generic con-
ditional independence assumption (CIA). The 
CIA swaps a vector of controls, denoted  X , 
for  x in the CRA, equation (1). The CIA is a 
strong assumption, not guaranteed to hold in 
 non-randomized studies. We use the CIA to 
compute non-experimental estimates of treat-
ment effects in the pre-experimental cohort in 
three ways: OLS, swapping  α X for  α x in equation (2); propensity score weighting as in Hirano, 
Imbens, and Ridder (2003); and a hybrid regres-
sion/reweighting procedure suggested by Kline (2011).
The propensity score weighting (HIR) esti-
mator builds on the fact that the CIA implies
   E [ Y 1 | X] = E [ yD ___ λ X | X] 
  E [ Y 0 | X] = E [ y(1 − D) ______1 −  λ X  | X] ,
where  λ X ≡ E[D | X] is the conditional-on- 
covariates probability of treatment. Bringing 
these expressions inside a single expectation and 
over a common denominator, the average treat-
ment effect is
  δ = E { y [ D −  λ X ]  _______ λ X [1 −  λ X ]  } . 
Our estimates based on this formula use logit to 
model  λ X .
Kline’s estimator begins with linear models 
for conditional means:
  E [ Y 0 | X] = E [ y | X, D = 0] =  X ′ β 0 
 E [ Y 1 | X] = E [ y | X, D = 1] =  X ′ β 1 . 
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These imply
  δ =  ( β 1 −  β 0 ) ′ E [X] . 
Finally, we compute sharp RD estimates in 
the 2012 data using the STBF reviewer score, 
s , as our running variable. These come from a 
version of equation (2) estimated in the sam-
ple of applicants who scored within four points 
of the cutoff used for guaranteed funding. The 
treatment here is a dummy variable,  Z , indicat-
ing reviewer scores above the cutoff. The sample 
to the left of the cutoff is limited to those in the 
randomly-assigned control group.
III. Data and Results
Random assignment of scholarship offers bal-
anced the characteristics of treatment and con-
trol applicants in the 2012 experimental sample, 
as the first two columns of Table 1 show. By 
contrast, award winners in the pre-experimental (2011) cohort  had higher high school GPAs and 
lower family incomes, on average, than those not 
awarded scholarships. This is consistent with a 
review process that favors both merit and finan-
cial need. We see broadly similar differences 
on either side of the threshold for guaranteed 
awards in 2012, though the income and gender 
differentials are smaller.  These  cross-threshold 
covariate gaps, shown in columns 5 and 6 of 
Table 1, compare experimental controls who 
scored no lower than four points below the 
threshold with students who were guaranteed 
awards and scored at most four points above the 
threshold. Total points ranged from 11 to 26.
Randomly-assigned Buffett scholarships 
increased four-year sophomore enrollment by a 
precisely-estimated 14.4 percentage points, an 
impressive effect given that only 64 percent of 
controls were enrolled in four-year colleges in 
the second follow-up year. This finding—our 
first experimental benchmark—appears in col-
umn 1 of Table 2. This column also shows that 
the experimental estimates are essentially invari-
ant to the choice of estimator used for covariate 
adjustment, an expected consequence of random 
assignment.
Given the substantial differences between 
2011 treated and control applicants, it’s not sur-
prising that treatment-control comparisons in 
this sample miss the experimental benchmark. 
Averaging across strata, the estimated treat-
ment effect is just 0.091 in the 2011 sample, an 
estimate reported in column 2 of Table 2. OLS 
with strata fixed effects produces  estimates 
Table 1—Descriptive Statistics
Experimental sample Observational sample RD sample
Control Treatment − Control Treatment − Control Treatment −
mean control mean control mean control
(1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)
Female 0.621 0.009 0.695  0.107***  0.647 0.039
(0.031) (0.030)  (0.040)
White 0.673 0.031 0.562 −0.139***  0.481 −0.140***
(0.028) (0.029)  (0.040)
EFC ($) 3,337 −52 1,826 −1,245*** 1,832 −1,248***
(235) (180) (266)
Income ($) 50,738  339 40,012 −12,605*** 39,055 −8,784***
(2,170) (2,850) (2,155)
GPA 3.44 0.005 3.49 0.056 ** 3.53 0.061*
(0.026) (0.026) (0.032)
Sample size 504 1,003 593 1,052 265 624
Notes: The experimental sample contains the 2012 treatment and control groups. The observational sample is the 2011 
 pre-experimental cohort. The RD sample contains applicants from the 2012 control group and guaranteed-award group who 
scored within four points of the guaranteed award cutoff. The running variable, (the reviewer score), ranges from 11 to 26.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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 indistinguishable from this matching estimate. 
The apparent negative selection bias in the 
observational estimates presumably reflects 
STBF’s focus on measures of need that are nega-
tively correlated with post-secondary outcomes.
Many of the variables used to screen applicants 
appear in our data, so perhaps selection bias can 
be eliminated using statistical controls. As panel 
B of column 2 shows, however, controlling for 
covariates, whether by regression, propensity 
score matching, or Kline-reweighting, boosts 
the observational estimates only slightly.3
3 In results not reported here, we find that reweighting 
to produce estimates of the treatment on the treated or the 
treatment on the untreated leaves the observational estimates 
largely unchanged and still well below the experimental 
benchmark. As in Angrist and Rokkanen (2012), HIR and 
linear reweighting estimates are similar, but the HIR esti-
mates are much less precise. 
Why does controlling for covariates move 
the observational estimates so little? Although 
covariates in the observational sample are highly 
imbalanced, and we would expect those listed 
in Table 1 to predict college enrollment, it turns 
out that they explain too little of the outcome 
variation in our data to matter much as controls. 
As Pischke and Schwandt (2014) note, when the 
covariates at hand are noisy or imperfect proxies 
for strong predictors of outcomes, the addition 
of even highly imbalanced controls can have lit-
tle impact on estimated treatment effects.
A. Within-Study RD
Our RD analysis uses only applicants that 
scored within four points of the cutoff for 
guaranteed awards. The relevant experimen-
tal benchmark therefore compares randomized 
treatment and control observations that fall in 
Table 2—Effects on Four-Year College Enrollment in Year Two
Experimental Observational Experimental RD
sample sample RD sample sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control mean 0.639 0.708 0.685 0.685
Raw difference 0.142*** 0.086*** 0.107*** 0.044
(0.028) (0.027) (0.033) (0.037)
Panel A. Strata-adjusted estimates
Matching 0.144*** 0.091*** 0.116*** 0.096***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.027) (0.031)
OLS 0.144*** 0.091*** 0.116*** 0.099***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.027) (0.032)
Panel B. Esitmates with selection controls
OLS 0.143*** 0.094*** 0.120*** 0.107***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.026) (0.032)
OLS with r.v. 0.024
 controls (0.064)
HIR 0.143*** 0.097* 0.119*
(0.054) (0.058) (0.063)
Kline 0.143*** 0.092*** 0.119 ***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.025)
Sample size 1,003 1,052 715 624
Notes: Samples for columns 1, 2, and 4 are defined in Table 1. The sample for column 3 includes applicants in the experimen-
tal sample who scored within four points of the guaranteed award cutoff. Estimates in panel B are from models that include 
linear controls for GPA, EFC, imputed family income, and dummies for gender and nonwhite race. HIR standard errors are 
bootstrapped with 1,000 replications.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
MAY 2015506 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
this bandwidth. The strata-adjusted experimen-
tal estimate in this high-scoring subsample, 
shown in column 3 of Table 2, is 0.116. The gap 
between this estimate and the full-sample result 
in column 1 is likely due to the negative merit 
gradient in treatment impacts documented in 
our working paper. Specifically, applicants who 
appear best-prepared for college gained the least 
from STBF awards.
Comparing treatment and control observa-
tions in the RD bandwidth produces a strata-ad-
justed (OLS) estimate of 0.099. This estimate, 
reported in column 4 of Table 2, is noticeably 
closer to its experimental benchmark than is the 
raw difference in column 4. Adding the full set 
of controls produces an OLS estimate (0.107) 
that closes the gap even further.
These OLS estimates come from regression 
models that omit the running variable, in this 
case, the STBF reviewer score,  s . This omission 
is justified by the assumption that applicants 
near the treatment threshold are similar enough 
to eliminate secular running variable effects 
on outcomes. Moreover, as in Angrist and 
Rokkanen (2012), the inclusion of other covari-
ates may mitigate the need for running variable 
controls. The STBF reviewer score is known to 
be a function of covariates like GPA, so condi-
tional on these variables, scores may be as good 
as randomly assigned.4
Do running variable controls matter? In prac-
tice, we’re handicapped here by the coarseness 
of the running variable, which offers only four 
points of support upon which to base implicit 
extrapolation of average potential outcomes 
across the award threshold. Indeed, as column 4 
of Table 2 shows, inclusion of a linear running 
variable control interacted with treatment (that 
is,  s and  sZ ) generates an imprecisely estimated 
treatment effect close to zero. This impreci-
sion and sensitivity to running variable controls 
emerges in spite of the fact that the coefficients 
on  s and  sZ aren’t significantly different from 
zero.
4 This argument can’t be applied to the 2011 sample 
because the 2011 review process did not rely on a clearly 
defined scoring rubric. 
IV. Discussion
In the absence of random assignment, insti-
tutional knowledge opens the door to credi-
ble quasi-experimental research designs. This 
knowledge may come in the form of informa-
tion on the covariates that determine treatment 
assignment, as in Dehejia and Wahba’s (1999) 
influential re-examination of LaLonde (1986). 
In our application, covariates strongly related to 
treatment assignment are too weakly related to 
outcomes to eliminate selection bias. Other insti-
tutional features turn out to be more valuable: 
an RD estimate exploiting an award threshold 
replicates experimental findings for applicants 
near the cutoff (though not the overall treatment 
effect). A key weakness here, however, is the 
coarseness of the running variable. The addition 
of controls for the running variable and its inter-
action with treatment status generates an impre-
cise RD estimate of zero.
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